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Abstract
We address the problem of how to define an importance index in multicriteria decision
problems, when a numerical representation of preferences is given. We make no restrictive
assumption on the model, which could have discrete or continuous attributes, and in partic-
ular, it is not assumed that the model is monotonically increasing or decreasing with respect
to the attributes. Our analysis first considers discrete models, which are seen to be equiva-
lent to multichoice games. We propose essentially two importance indices, namely the signed
importance index and the absolute importance index, both based on the average variation
of the value of the model induced by a given attribute. We provide several axiomatizations
for these importance indices, extend them to the continuous case, and finally illustrate them
with examples: classical simple models and an example of discomfort evaluation based on
real data.
Keywords: Multiple criteria analysis, Multichoice game, Shapley value, Choquet integral.
1 Introduction
The notion of importance of attributes or criteria in multicriteria decision aiding (MCDA) has
always been central in the modelling and analysis of preferences. It is crucial for practitioners
for many reasons. Once the model is learnt, the user needs to check the validity of the model,
in particular, by checking whether the mean importance of criteria fits with his feeling. In
the opposite case, he shall revise his preferences. If some criteria/attribute turn out to have
a very small importance, they can be discarded in an approximate and simplified model. On
the other hand, if the user wishes to have a synthetic explanation of the model, focusing on
the few criteria/attributes having the largest mean importance provides a simple explanation
of the model. Finally, the user is often asking for explanations of decisions made by the model.
A possible approach is to compute the importance of each criterion for a particular decision
(Labreuche and Fossier, 2018). It is instructive to compare this “local” importance with the
mean importance. For instance, a mean importance higher than the local importance implies
that the corresponding criterion has been weakened by other ones for that particular decision.
What does it mean that a criterion is important and how can it be quantified under the
form of an importance index? This question can have a simple answer in simple models based
∗The paper is a follow-up of two papers of the authors presented at ECSQARU 2017 and ADT 2017 (Ridaoui
et al., 2017a,b)
†Corresponding author.
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on aggregation of scores on individual criteria, where the aggregation is done by the weighted
arithmetic mean. Then it is tempting to say that the weights used in the aggregation may be
considered as the importance indices of the criteria. This intuition reveals to be correct only
under certain circumstances, namely when the scores to be aggregated are calibrated on the
same scale and that no other device enters the decision process, like vetos, thresholds, etc.
Within the above framework, when more sophisticated aggregation models are used, like the
Choquet integral (Choquet, 1953; Grabisch, 1996; Grabisch and Labreuche, 2010), the Shapley
value, a concept borrowed from game theory, is often used. The reason is that the Choquet
integral is a generalization of the weighted arithmetic mean, whose “weights” are replaced by a
set function v called capacity or fuzzy measure. Capacities can be seen as particular coalitional
(TU) games, which are functions v assigning to coalitions of players their benefit or worth. The
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is a vector assigning to each player its “final” benefit or worth,
which is a sharing of the benefit v(N) achieved by the set N of all players. Then, in the MCDA
context, N is taken as the set of criteria, and v(S) for any S ⊆ N , is intuitively the “weight of
importance” of the group of criteria S. Considering v(N) as the total importance of all criteria,
the Shapley value then expresses the individual importance of criteria.
For other sophisticated models or not necessarily of the aggregation type, like the GAI
(Generalized Additive Independence) model of (Fishburn, 1967), we are not aware of any general
definition of an importance index. This paper precisely aims at filling this gap.
Our approach is quantitative, as our aim is to define a numerical importance index, and
therefore our starting point will be a numerical representation of the preferences, rather than
the preferences itself. The strong point of our approach is that no specific assumption is needed
on the numerical representation. In particular, we can deal with continuous or discrete-valued
attributes, although most of our effort will bear on the discrete case, the continuous case being
obtained by interpolation. Also, we do not assume monotonicity, that is, the satisfaction of the
decision maker does not necessarily increase nor decrease with the values of the attributes.
Basically, we propose two families of importance indices, plus a natural generalization of
the second one. The first one considers that the importance index of attribute i is a (weighted)
average of the variation of the model along the i axis. This idea comes from the field of aggre-
gation functions, and it is known from Marichal (1998) that applied to the Choquet integral,
it yields the Shapley value. We show, however, that this approach is meaningful only if the
model is monotone with respect to (w.r.t.) the attributes, otherwise the average variation along
an axis could be close to zero, simply because positive variations cancel negative ones. This is
why we propose a second approach, taking the cumulation of absolute variations rather than
the average of variations. This leads to the family of absolute importance indices, contrasting
with the former one called signed importance index. Realizing that taking the sum of absolute
values amounts to consider the L1 norm, a third family, called norm-based importance indices,
is proposed where the amount of variation is computed by a norm. This family generalizes the
absolute importance index.
Our work makes also a contribution to the theory of multichoice games (Hsiao and Raghavan,
1993), by providing alternative definitions of Shapley-like values for multichoice games. Indeed,
in the discrete case, a numerical model of preference can be seen as a multichoice game (see, e.g.,
Grabisch and Labreuche (2018); Labreuche and Grabisch (2018)). Our approach is axiomatic,
so as to ensure rational and clear properties for the defined indices. Also, it shows clearly the
difference with the values proposed in the literature of game theory. These values satisfy the
axiom of efficiency, which is rooted in game theory, but, as we will explain below, it has no
reason to hold in a MCDA context. This is why these values cannot be used as importance
indices, which motivates our study. Lastly, we mention that the usage of importance indices
is not limited to the field of MCDA: having an information on which variables are the most
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influential on a model U is very useful in Experimental Design, and also for the interpretation
of Classification or Machine Learning models (Datta et al.; Lundberg and Lee, 2017). These
two references use Shapley or Banzhaf indices to interpret a classification model. The use of
such indices has recently become popular in AI – under the domain of Explainable AI (XAI).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework, notation and the
necessary background. Section 3 is a discussion on how to define importance indices, introducing
our three families. The related literature is given in Section 4. The main part of the paper
consists in Sections 5 and 6, giving the axiomatizations in the discrete case (hence equivalent to
a multichoice game) of the signed and the absolute importance indices (another axiomatization
of both indices is also presented in Section 10). Section 7 gives an axiomatization of the family of
norm-based indices. The usage of the signed and absolute importance indices are illustrated on
an example in Section 8. Section 9 addresses the continuous case. It shows that if interpolation
is done by the Choquet integral, then the previous definitions of signed and absolute importance
indices are still valid for the continuous case. The appendices contain the proofs of the results
and show the logical independence of the axioms used to characterize the signed importance
indices.
To summarize, the highlights of our approach are:
(i) It is crucial in applications to provide the mean importance of criteria/attributes, in
MCDA but also in other fields, especially Machine Learning.
(ii) The current proposals for defining criteria importance are model specific. We provide
model-agnostic importance indices without specific assumptions (monotonicity, continu-
ous/discrete, etc.).
(iii) Two complementary importance indices are proposed. The signed index indicates the
overall trend of the model w.r.t. an attribute (either increasing or decreasing). The
absolute index measures the amount of variation of the model induced by an attribute
regardless of its monotonicity.
(iv) The proposed indices contribute to the theory of multichoice games, by providing alter-
native definitions of the Shapley value.
2 The framework
Throughout the paper, the cardinality of sets will be denoted by corresponding lower case
letters, e.g., |N | = n, |S| = s, etc. For simplicity, singletons {i} are often denoted by i.
We consider a multicriteria decision aiding (MCDA) problem with n attributes X1, . . . , Xn.
We denote by N = {1, . . . , n} the index set of attributes. The set of potential alternatives is
therefore the Cartesian product X = X1 × · · · ×Xn.
There is no restriction on the Xi’s, i.e., they may be continuous (Xi = R or is an interval
of R) or discrete sets, however, in the former case, we select in each attribute Xi a finite set
of values ai0, . . . , a
i
ki
, called levels, (∀i ∈ N, ki ∈ N, such that ki ≥ 1). There must be for each
attribute at least two levels (these would be the upper and lower bounds of Xi when it is an
interval of R). For the most part of our development (definition and axiomatization of some
importance indices), we consider only these levels, so that all is working as if the attributes
were discrete. We address the continuous case in Section 9.
The precise value of the chosen levels (or values of the discrete attributes) aij playing no
role in our development (except in Section 9), we refer to them by simply giving their subindex,
i.e., alternative (a1j1 , a
2
j2
, . . . , anjn) is represented by (j1, j2, . . . , jn). This amounts to considering
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alternatives as elements of the Cartesian product L := L1 × · · · × Ln, with Li = {0, 1, . . . , ki}.
Also, we introduce Γ(L) = {0, k1}× · · ·×{0, kn}, the set of “vertices” of L. Although a discrete
attribute Xi is not necessarily ordered, our notation using Li automatically induces an implicit
ordering on the values of the attribute: aij ≤ aik iff j ≤ k. This also induces a partial order on L
by taking the product order: for x, y ∈ L, x ≤ y if xi ≤ yi for all i = 1, . . . , n. We write x  y
if x ≤ y and x 6= y for every x, y ∈ L.
As customary in decision theory, for any x ∈ X (or x ∈ L) and S ⊆ N , xS denotes the
restriction of x to the coordinates in S, while x−S denotes the restriction to the coordinates in
N \S. Accordingly, we use LS , XS , L−S , X−S for the restricted Cartesian products of attributes.
Hence, with x−i ∈ L−i and ` ∈ Li, (x−i, `i) is an element of L whose coordinate i is ` and x−i is
the vector of the other coordinates. For an alternative x ∈ L, and i ∈ N such that xi + 1 ≤ ki
x+1i denotes the vector (x−i, xi+1). As far as no confusion arises, (x−i, (ki)i) is simply denoted
by (x−i, ki). The vector 0N = (0, . . . , 0) is the null alternative of L, and kN = (k1, . . . , kn) is
the top element of L. For each x ∈ L, we denote by Σ(x) = {i ∈ N | xi > 0} the support of x,
and by K(x) = {i ∈ N | xi = ki} the kernel of x. Their cardinalities are respectively denoted
by σ(x) and κ(x).
We suppose that the preferences of the decision maker over alternatives in L can be repre-
sented numerically by a value function v : L→ R (Note: It is out of the scope of this paper to
say how v can be obtained; depending on its chosen form, many classical methods in MCDA
and MAUT can be applied for this). We suppose that v(0N ) = 0, which is no restriction
since most of the time numerical representation of preferences are given up to a positive affine
transformation.
Apart this, we make no special assumption on v: the value function could be additive, or
be of more sophisticated form (e.g., Generalized Additive Independence (GAI) model, etc.),
anyway, we use in the sequel only its numerical values v(x) for each x ∈ L.
In particular, the classical property of (increasing) monotonicity, which says that
x ≤ y ⇒ v(x) ≤ v(y), (1)
or its converse (decreasing monotonicity) or any mixed version, are not assumed here. Mono-
tonicity means that the higher (or the lower) the value of the attributes, the better the alter-
native. If this holds in many practical examples (cost, production time, benefit, etc.), it is not
true in general that maximizing or minizing attribute values maximizes the satisfaction of the
decision maker: it may be the case that the ideal value of the attribute is not one of the bounds.
The following example shows this.
Example 1 (Employee working conditions). We consider a function v measuring the over-
all degree of well-being at work. A high degree indicates that the employee is comfortably
seated with ideal conditions allowing a good productivity. To keep it simple, we consider three
attributes: the temperature X1 of the room, the light intensity X2 (for artificial lightening),
and the level of comfort X3 of the chair. One can readily see that the optimal temperature is
not reached for extreme values. The ideal temperature is more likely to be optimal around 22
degree Celsius. Likewise, the ideal light intensity should not be too strong for the employee’s
eyes. Finally the level of comfort of the chair that is best for the standpoint of his productivity
is neither too low (which can generate pain in the back of the employee) nor too high (the
employee might fall asleep). To sum-up, for each attribute, there exists an optimal value ̂`i ∈ Li
such that v is increasing in xi below ̂`i, and then decreasing in xi above ̂`i.
Observe that in Example 1, the preference is single-peaked: on each attribute, the function
v is increasing till an optimal value is reached, and then decreasing. A drastic example of
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single-peaked value function is the δx Dirac function, defined by, for any x ∈ L \ {0N},
δx(y) =
{
1, if y = x
0, otherwise
(2)
It is worth noting that this general framework permits to recover some classical concepts.
When k1 = . . . = kn = 1, v is a pseudo-Boolean function (Crama and Hammer, 2011; Hammer
and Rudeanu, 1968) v : {0, 1}N → R vanishing at 0N . Through the correspondence between a
set S and its characteristic function 1S , it can be put in the form of a function µ : 2
N → R,
which is a TU-game in cooperative game theory (see, e.g., Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003); Peters
(2008)). When monotonicity (1) is enforced, we obtain capacities introduced by Choquet (1953).
When ki ≥ 1 for each i ∈ N , multichoice games, introduced by Hsiao and Raghavan (1993), are
recovered. Monotone multichoice games, i.e., satisfying (1), were introduced by Grabisch and
Labreuche (2003) under the name of kN -ary capacities.
It turns out that in any case, our numerical representation v on L can be seen as a multichoice
game. We will therefore work on the set of multichoice games on L, which we denote by G(L).
In addition, GM (L) is the set of monotone multichoice games.
We finish this section by introducing some technical notions on multichoice games. The
derivative of v w.r.t. an attribute i at point x ∈ L such that xi < ki is defined by
∆iv(x) = v(x+ 1i)− v(x). (3)
The set G(L) of multichoice games is a vector space of dimension k1k2 · · · kn− 1. A trivial basis
of G(L) is the set {δx}x∈L\{0N} introduced above. Another one is the basis of unanimity games
ux, which are defined for any x ∈ L \ {0N} by
ux(y) =
{
1, if y ≥ x
0, otherwise.
(4)
Then, for any game v ∈ G,
v =
∑
x∈L\{0N}
mv(x)ux. (5)
The coordinates mv(x), x ∈ L \ {0N}, of a game v are known to be the Mo¨bius transform of
v (Rota, 1964), which can be seen as a function mv : L → R with mv(0N ) := 0. It is useful
to consider G+(L) the set of games whose Mo¨bius transform is nonnegative, and to note that
G+(L) ⊆ GM (L) is a cone. It is easy to see, as for classical games, that any multichoice game
v ∈ G(L) can be uniquely decomposed into
v = v+ − v− (6)
with v+, v− ∈ G+(L) (v+, v− simply correspond respectively to the nonnegative coefficients and
negative coefficients of the Mo¨bius transform of v).
3 How to define importance indices
Our aim is to define an importance index in this general framework, where no special assumption
is made on the model, numerically represented by v, apart that for the moment, v is defined on
discrete attributes.
The value function v expresses the intensity of satisfaction of the decision maker for the
different alternatives in L, which are multidimensional vectors x = (x1, . . . , xn). In this sense,
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v can be seen as an aggregation function, yielding a single real number from n inputs. The
importance index of an attribute should reflect to which extent the attribute influences the
output value. As this influence may depend on the value of the other attributes, a kind of
average influence should be taken. As the output value is a real number, influence is visible
only through a change or variation of this value. Hence, the importance of an attribute is
related to the amount of variation this attribute can produce on v. This view is in fact the one
taken in the domain of aggregation functions F : In → I, where I is some real interval (see,
e.g., Grabisch et al. (2009)[§10.3]). The importance index of attribute (dimension) i is defined
by, assuming I = [a, b],
φi(F ) =
1
(b− a)n
∫
[a,b]n
∆iF (x)
b− a dx =
1
(b− a)n
∫
[a,b]n
∂F (x)
∂xi
dx, (7)
where ∆iF (x) = F (bi, x−i) − F (ai, x−i), x ∈ In. As aggregation functions are always nonde-
creasing in each argument, ∆iF (x) is the total variation on dimension i at x, while the second
equality makes apparent that the importance index of i is an average of the local variation due
to i.
We apply the same idea to the value function v, although v is not supposed to be monotone
and is defined on a discrete domain. A general expression for the importance index of attribute
i w.r.t. v would be, using the (discrete) derivative (3):
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
pix∆iv(x) (8)
where the pix are real coefficients (weights). If the weights p
i
x depend only on p
i
x−i , then
ki−1∑
xi=0
pix−i∆iv(x) = p
i
x−i(v(x−i, ki)− v(x−i, 0i)),
which reminds the first equality in (7). We will specify further and axiomatize the family of
importance indices defined in (8) in Section 5.
Observe that in case of an aggregation function or a monotone increasing value function
v, the importance index defined in (7) or (8) is a positive quantity, while it becomes negative
when the considered function is monotone decreasing. For this reason, we may call such type
of importance index a signed importance index.
Signed importance indices may give counterintuitive results, though. Suppose that the
value function v is such that, roughly speaking, there is as much positive variation as negative
variation along the i axis. The total variation would be then zero, which seems to indicate
that attribute i has no importance, although it does have since it induces some variation of
the function v. This is exactly the situation given in Example 1: for every attribute, when
ranging from lowest value to highest value of the attribute, the variation is first positive and
then negative, and we conclude that all attributes have a negligible importance. The extreme
example is given by the δx function (2), where all attributes have zero importance for all x such
that 0 < xi < ki for all i ∈ N (provided that the weights have some suitable symmetry, e.g., pix
does not depend on xi).
A simple way to avoid this drawback is to cumulate the local variations, instead of summing
them algebraically; put differently, the sum of the absolute value of the local variations should
be taken:
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
pix|∆iv(x)|. (9)
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We call this family the absolute importance indices. One may go one step further by remarking
that the absolute value is the L1 norm, and that any norm can be taken instead:
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
pix‖∆iv(x)‖,
or even in a more compact form, considering norms with weights on coordinates:
φi(v) = ‖∆i(v)‖ (i ∈ N). (10)
We may call this the norm-based importance indices. In Section 6, we will axiomatize and
further specify the family of absolute importance indices, while Section 7 will address the case
of norm-based importance indices.
4 Related works
Many models in MCDA are additive and based on the weighted arithmetic mean (AHP, ELEC-
TRE, PROMETHEE, etc.), where the weights of the arithmetic are directly taken as weight of
importance of the attributes. As for more sophisticated nonadditive models, the problem has
been well studied for models based on the Choquet integral (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2010,
2016), however, as far as we know, there is no specific study on GAI models.
We elaborate on Choquet integral-based models. The most basic model in this category has
the form:
U(x) = Cµ(u1(x1), . . . , un(xn))
where Cµ indicates the Choquet integral w.r.t. a capacity µ on 2
N , and u1, . . . , un are marginal
utility functions on the different attributes which are commensurable. Recall that a capacity
is a monotone game, thus it corresponds to the case k1 = · · · = kn = 1 of multichoice games.
It has been suggested first by Murofushi (1992) and later developed by Grabisch (1996) that
the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), a concept borrowed from cooperative game theory, should
be used as importance index for such models.
Generally speaking, a value is a mapping φ : G(2N )→ RN assigning a payoff vector to any
game v. The expression of the Shapley value is given by, for any v ∈ G(2N ),
φShi (v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
(
v(S ∪ i)− v(S)),∀i ∈ N. (11)
The classical intepretation of this formula in game theory is as follows: the players are ordered
and they receive their marginal contribution to the coalition formed by the previous players as
their payment. Then an average over all orderings is performed. Through the identity between a
set S and its characteristic function 1S , the comparison of (11) with (8) shows that the Shapley
value is a particular signed importance index, with ki = 1 (∀i ∈ N) and the weights given by
piS =
(n−s−1)!s!
n! . Remembering that a capacity is monotone, it turns out that the Shapley value
is also an absolute importance index.
More interestingly, it is shown in Grabisch et al. (2000) that taking F in (7) as the Choquet
integral w.r.t. µ, the importance index φi(Cµ) coincides with φ
Sh
i (µ), the Shapley value of µ,
showing the well-foundedness of the Shapley value as importance index for Choquet integral-
based models.
We note that a corresponding result holds for the MLE model (multilinear extension of
Owen (1972)) and the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf, 1965) (see, again, Grabisch et al. (2000)).
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The previous paragraph shows the relation between importance indices in MCDA and values
(Shapley, Banzhaf) in game theory. As our function v when defined on a discrete domain can
be interpreted as a multichoice game, the question arises whether Shapley-like values defined
for multichoice games can be used as importance indices. Among the many definitions proposed
in the literature, let us mention Hsiao and Raghavan (1993) (historically the first one), van den
Nouweland et al. (1995), Klijn et al. (1999), Peters and Zank (2005), Grabisch and Lange (2007),
etc. The value of Peters and Zank reads:
φPZi (v) =
∑
x−i∈Γ(L−i)
(n− κ(x−i)− 1)!κ(x−i)!
n!
(v(x−i, k)− v(x−i, 0)), (12)
with ki = k, ∀i ∈ N .
Clearly, (12) has the form of a signed importance index, although one can remark that only
vertices of L−i are taken in the sum.
All these values, for classical games or multichoice games, are characterized by axioms,
among which we always find linearity (φ is a linear operator on G(L)), a null axiom (a player with
zero marginal contribution receives zero), a symmetry (or anonymity) axiom (the numbering of
the players has no influence on the payoff) and efficiency (the sum of the payoffs for all players
should be equal to v(kN ), where kN is the top element of L). While the first three axioms are
easily transposable in the MCDA framework, the efficiency axiom is rooted in game theory and
there is no convincing interpretation in MCDA. Indeed, efficiency means that the total benefit
of the cooperation, represented by v(kN ), should be shared among the players with no waste. In
MCDA, the concept of sharing is not natural, and there is no reason why the sum of importance
indices should be equal to v(kN ). When v is monotone, then v(kN ) is the evaluation of the best
possible alternative, and in this case it may be meaningful to consider the importance index
of a criterion as a percentage of the best possible evaluation. However, this interpretation fails
when v is not monotone. Especially, in Example 1, the value of v(kN ) should be close to 0, as
the highest values of the attributes are not considered as comfortable.
This explains why multichoice game values of the literature cannot be used as importance
indices, and this motivates our study. It also explains why it is not enough to specify a general
form for the family (signed importance index, absolute importance index) as in (8), (9), but
one has to specify the weights, in order that the resulting index has suitable properties. This is
why we think that the only way is to proceed axiomatically. The next two sections axiomatize
some signed and absolute importance indices, which are meaningful in terms of MCDA.
5 Axiomatization of signed importance indices
Let us denote by φ : G(N) → RN an importance index, where G(N) denotes the set of all
multichoice games on N (that is, with arbitrary number of levels for each i ∈ N , i.e., with any
L). The aim of this section is to give an axiomatization of the family defined by (8), and by
imposing additional axioms, to further specify possible sets of weights. The first two axioms we
will introduce are close to the classical axioms used by Shapley in his seminal paper (Shapley,
1953).
Linearity axiom (L) : φ is linear on G(L), i.e., ∀v, w ∈ G(L), ∀α ∈ R,
φ(v + αw) = φ(v) + αφ(w).
The linearity axiom means that if we have the preferences v and w of two DMs, and the resulting
preference is a linear combination of them (yielding v = α v + β w), then it is equivalent to
apply φ before or after the linear transformation.
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The next axiom is an invariance property. It says that the calculus of the importance
index does not depend on the position on the “grid” L. For this, we need for convenience to
consider that, w.r.t. to some attribute i, the grid is “periodized” modulo ki, i.e.: . . . , ki−2, ki−
1, 0, 1, . . . , ki − 1, 0, . . ..
Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two functions v, w ∈ G(L) such that, for
some i ∈ N ,
∆iv(x) = ∆iw(x− 1i), x−i ∈ L−i, xi ∈ {0, . . . , ki − 1}(mod ki).
Then,
φi(v) = φi(w).
Axiom (I) says that if two games v, w have the same increments along an attribute i up to a
shift of one unit on this attribute, the importance of attribute i is the same for v, w. Note
that for xi = 0 the condition reads ∆iv(x−i, 0i) = ∆iw(x−i, (ki − 1)i). In contrast to the
classical symmetry or anonymity axiom which pertains to the identity of the players/attributes,
it is a kind of “geographical” symmetry or homogeneity axiom, saying that in the grid, the
computation of the index is done without distortion due to the location in the grid.
Remark 1. It can be seen that this axiom implies the null axiom, which is classical in the
axiomatization of the Shapley value. It says that a player i ∈ N who brings no contribution
(i.e., µ(S ∪ i) = µ(S), ∀S ⊆ N \ {i}: no variation, in our language) should receive a zero payoff
(in our language: has no importance). This definition can be easily extended to multichoice
games as follows: i ∈ N is a null attribute for v ∈ G(L) if v(x + 1i) = v(x), ∀x ∈ L, xi < ki.
The null axiom (N) says that if i is null for v, then φi(v) = 0.
The null axiom is implied by (I): indeed, consider w = 0 (null game). Then the condition on
∆iv is equivalent to say that i is a null player. It follows from linearity that φi(w) = 0, hence
φi(v) = 0 too.
Proposition 1. Under axioms (L) and (I), ∀v ∈ G(L), ∀i ∈ N ,
φi(v) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
pix−i
(
v(x−i, ki)− v(x−i, 0i)
)
, pix−i ∈ R, ∀x−i ∈ L−i. (13)
All proofs of the propositions and theorems are given in Appendix A.
Axiom (I) in combination with (L) implies that we only need to look at the variation of v
between the extreme values 0 and ki. The evaluation on the intermediate elements of Li does
not intervene.
We now introduce the symmetry axiom.
Symmetry for Dirac games (SD): Let x ∈ L \ {0N}.
• ∀i, j ∈ K(x), φi(δx) = φj(δx),
• ∀i, j ∈ N \ Σ(x), φi(δx) = φj(δx).
The symmetry axiom means that for the Dirac game, there is an equal importance for attributes
in the kernel, or outside the support of the game.
In game theory, it is common to use an efficiency axiom, meaning that the total sum∑
i∈N φi(v) (recall that in this context φi(v) is interpreted as a payoff given to i) should be
equal to the total worth or benefit, v(kN ). As explained in Section 4, no such interpretation
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holds in our context, but some substitute to efficiency (normalization or calibration axiom) has
to be found in order to determine the weights pix−i uniquely.
As the signed importance index of attribute i reflects the overall (algebraic) variation of v
along this axis, the sum of the importance indices should be made equal to the total (algebraic)
variation of v, which is naturally defined as the sum of variations of v over all positions x in the
grid, where all components of x are increased by one unit (i.e., a move along the main diagonal).
Moving along the main diagonal from x measures the effect of all attributes simultaneously and
permits to capture correlations between variables.
Efficiency axiom (E):∑
i∈N
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
(
v(x+ 1N )− v(x)
)
(14)
Remark 2. Interestingly, although the above equation is clearly in the spirit of variation calculus
suitable to our approach, making ki = 1,∀i ∈ N leads to
∑
i∈N φi(v) = v(1N )− v(0N ) = v(1N ),
i.e., the classical efficiency axiom. It shows that the usual definition of efficiency for multichoice
games is not the only way to generalize the classical definition.
Applied to an arbitrary function v, the right handside of equation (14) does not give any
peculiar result. Hence, let us take the Dirac function δx, central in our discussion. We have
several cases:
• κ(x) 6= 0 and σ(x) = n. Then x − 1N ∈ L because no component of x is equal to 0, and
we have δx(x)− δx(x− 1N ) = 1. Note that δx(y + 1N )− δx(y) = 0 for any y 6= x− 1 and
y, y + 1 ∈ L. Therefore, ∑
i∈N
φi(δx) = 1. (15)
• κ(x) = 0 and σ(x) < n. Then x+ 1N ∈ L because no component of x is equal to ki, and
we have δx(x+ 1N )− δx(x) = −1. Note that δx(y+ 1N )− δx(y) = 0 for any other possible
y, therefore, ∑
i∈N
φi(δx) = −1. (16)
• κ(x) 6= 0 and σ(x) < n. There are both components equal to 0 and to ki in x. Therefore,
neither x+ 1N nor x− 1N belong to L, and for any possible y ∈ L s.t. y+ 1 ∈ L, we have
δx(y + 1N )− δx(y) = 0. Therefore, ∑
i∈N
φi(δx) = 0. (17)
• κ(x) = 0 and σ(x) = n. We have δx(x + 1N ) − δx(x) = −1 and δx(x) − δx(x − 1N ) = 1,
otherwise the difference is 0 for all other y. Therefore,∑
i∈N
φi(δx) = 0. (18)
Theorem 1. Under axioms (L), (I), (SD) and (E), for all v ∈ G(L)
φi(v) = φ
s
i(v) :=
∑
x−i∈L−i
(n− σ(x−i)− 1)!κ(x−i)!
(n+ κ(x−i)− σ(x−i))!
(
v(x−i, ki)− v(x−i, 0i)
)
, ∀i ∈ N (19)
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The theorem shows that the signed importance index for i is a weighted average of the total
variation of v along the axis i. The weights, which are implied by (E), resemble the weights in
the formula of the Shapley value.
To show the independence of the four axioms (L), (I), (SD) and (E), we have slightly
weakened the invariance axiom (I) by adding the technical condition v(x + 1N ) − v(x) =
w(x+ 1N )− w(x) for each x ∈ L, such that xi < ki, for all i ∈ N (axiom (I’)). The additional
technical condition does not make the axiom more attractive nor intuitive.
Theorem 2. Under axioms (L), (I’), (SD) and (E), for all v ∈ G(L)
φi(v) = φ
s
i(v) (20)
The logical independence of axioms (L), (I’), (SD) and (E) is shown in Appendix B.
6 Axiomatization of absolute importance indices
We now turn to the axiomatization of the family defined by (9), and of particular instances of
it. The major difficulty in axiomatizing (9) is that φ does not satisfy linearity, and therefore it
is not possible to start from the decomposition of games in some basis. Instead, the idea is the
following: the expression of v in the basis of unanimity games (5) becomes a conic combination
when v is in G+(L). As any game can be written as the difference of two games in G+(L) (see
(6)), it is then possible to extend this expression to monotone games, for which the absolute
value in |v(x+ 1i)− v(x)| is no more necessary.
Conic Combination axiom (CC) : For every v, w ∈ GM (L), for every α ∈ R+,
φ(v + αw) = φ(v) + αφ(w).
The Conic Combination axiom permits to obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. Under axiom (CC), for all i ∈ N , there exists constants aix ∈ R, for all x ∈ L,
such that for all v ∈ GM (L),
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
aixv(x). (21)
Taking two multichoice games v and w for which the marginal contribution of a player i in
a game v is the same or the opposite of that in a game w, the average importance of attribute
i shall be the same for v and w. We propose the following axiom.
Marginal contribution axiom (MC): Let i ∈ N and v, w ∈ G(L) such that
|∆iv(x)| = |∆iw(x)|, ∀x ∈ L, xi < ki.
Then φi(v) = φi(w).
These two axioms suffice to characterize the family of absolute importance indices.
Proposition 3. Under axioms (CC) and (MC), there exist real constants pix, i ∈ N, x ∈
L, xi < ki, such that for every v ∈ G(L),
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
pix|∆iv(x)|. (22)
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Remark 3. As it can be seen from (22), the null axiom (N) is implied by (CC) and (MC) (see
proof of Proposition 3).
We can now further restrict the family by imposing the invariance axiom that was used in
Section 5. We obtain:
Proposition 4. Under axioms (CC), (I) and (MC), for all v ∈ G(L)
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
pix−i |v(x+ 1i)− v(x)|,∀i ∈ N.
Absolute Efficiency (AE): Let x ∈ L such that N \ Σ(x) 6= ∅ and K(x) 6= ∅.∑
i∈K(x)
φi(δx) =
∑
i∈N\Σ(x)
φi(δx).
The absolute efficiency axiom says that the total importance of attributes in the kernel
equals the total importance of attributes outside the support. This property comes from the
following fact. Considering x ∈ L as above, by (17), the signed importance index yields
0 =
∑
i∈N
φsi(δx) =
∑
i∈K(x)
φsi(δx) +
∑
i∈N\Σ(x)
φsi(δx)
because for any i ∈ Σ(x) \K(x), φsi(δx) = 0. This implies
∑
i∈K(x) φ
s
i(δx) = −
∑
i∈N\Σ(x) φ
s
i(δx).
Now, for the absolute importance index, we should consider absolute differences instead of
signed ones, which immediately gives (AE), because φsi(δx) > 0 for i ∈ K(x) and φsi(δx) < 0 for
i ∈ N \ Σ(x).
Calibration axiom (C): For every x ∈ L such that N \ Σ(x) = ∅,∑
i∈K(x)
φi(δx) = 1.
The calibration axiom addresses the case (uncovered by the two previous axioms) where there
is no attribute outside the support of the Dirac game. Then again, all attributes in the kernel
have equal importance, whose sum is normalized to 1.
Theorem 3. Under axioms (CC), (I), (SD), (AE), (MC) and (C), for all v ∈ G(L) and all
i ∈ N ,
φi(v) = φ
a
i (v) :=
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
(n− σ(x−i)− 1)!κ(x−i)!
(n+ κ(x−i)− σ(x−i))! |v(x+ 1i)− v(x)|. (23)
The logical independence of axioms is shown in Appendix C.
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7 Norm-based importance indices
We now turn to the family of norm-based importance indices, which have the general form
(10). As explained in Section 3, they appear as a natural generalization of absolute importance
indices, which are based on the L1 norm or its weighted version.
A fundamental difficulty is that the use of a norm different from L1 forbids to take an
axiomatic approach similar to the one we used in Section 6, because there would exist no class
of games where a property similar to linearity would hold. Nevertheless, it is possible to obtain
a general form through a number of axioms which are presented below. In the rest of this
section i ∈ N is fixed.
Nonnegativity (NN): The importance index takes nonnegative values, i.e., φi :
G(L)→ R+.
Absolute Homogeneity (AH): For every α ∈ R and every game v ∈ G(L),
φi(αv) = |α|φi(v)
Subadditivity (SA): For any games v, w ∈ G(L),
φ(v + w) ≤ φ(v) + φ(w)
Strong Null axiom (SN): φi(v) = 0 if and only if i is null for v.
These axioms come directly from the definition of a norm, however, they are easily interpretable
in our MCDA context. The nonnegativity axiom says that importance indices are nonnegative
quantities. Absolute homogeneity says that multiplying a game by a constant just multiplies
the importance index by the magnitude of this constant (as the importance index should be
nonnegative). The subadditivity axiom expresses the fact that summing two games v, w may
mask the importance of an attribute: the positive variation of i at some point x for v can be
cancelled by a negative variation at the same point for w. Hence the overall variation for v+w
can be smaller than the sum of variations for v, w. Lastly, the strong null axiom is a strong
version of the usual null axiom, in the sense that only games whose attribute i is null lead to a
null importance index for i.
We obtain the following.
Theorem 4. Under axioms (NN), (AH), (SA) and (SN), there exists a norm ‖ · ‖ on
Rk(k+1)n−1 and a linear one-to-one mapping h on Rk(k+1)n−1 such that
φi(v) = ‖h ◦∆i(v)‖.
Additional axioms may be used to determine a particular norm or class of norms. Note
however that the precise determination of h through calibration or efficiency axioms seems to
be difficult as h lies inside the norm.
Note that since the four axioms (NN), (AH), (SA) and (SN) come directly from the
definition of a norm, they must be then independent.
8 Discussion and examples
We apply Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 with the following examples.
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Example 2. We give a practical example of computation of φsi and φ
a
i to the Dirac and una-
nimity games. Let x ∈ L \ {0N} and i ∈ N .
• The computation of φi w.r.t. δx gives
φsi(δx−i,0) = −φsi(δx−i,ki) = −
(n− σ(x−i)− 1)!κ(x−i)!
(n+ κ(x−i)− σ(x−i))! , and φi(δx−i,xi) = 0, ∀xi /∈ {0, ki}.
φai (δx−i,0) = φ
a
i (δx−i,ki) = φ
s
i(δx−i,ki), and φ
a
i (δx−i,xi) = 2φ
a
i (δx−i,ki),∀xi /∈ {0, ki}.
• The computation of φi w.r.t. ux gives,
φsi(ux) = φ
a
i (ux) =
∑
y−i∈L−i
y−i≥x−i
(n− σ(y−i)− 1)!κ(y−i)!
(n+ κ(y−i)− σ(y−i))! , ∀xi 6= 0.
Let us take for example N = {1, 2, 3}, kN = (2, 2, 3), and x = (0, 1, 3), we have,
φs1(δx) = −
1
2
, φs2(δx) = 0, φ
s
3(δx) =
1
2
,
φa1(δx) =
1
2
, φa2(δx) = 1, φ
a
3(δx) =
1
2
,
φs1(ux) = 0, φ
s
2(ux) = 1, φ
s
3(ux) = 3.
We note that φsi(δx) can be null when the peak is attained inside the domain (i = 2), is strictly
negative if the peak is attained at 0 (i = 1), and is strictly positive if the peak is attained at
the maximal value ki (i = 3). However, φ
a
i (δx) is always strictly positive.
These results are in accordance with the theory, i.e., they illustrate in particular the respec-
tive efficiency and calibration axioms (E), (AE), (C). Also, they are intuitively appealing:
(i) The absolute importance index accounts for the cumulated absolute variations along some
axis. For the game δx, its value changes along attributes 1 and 3 only once, while it changes
twice for attribute 2. This is exactly reflected by φa.
(ii) The signed importance index accounts for the average monotonicity of the function along
some axis. For attribute 1, δx(z) is decreasing along z1, hence φ
s
1(δx) < 0, while it is
increasing along attribute 3. Now, when z2 goes from 0 to 2, δx(z) is first increasing then
decreasing of the same amount. Thus, the overall variation is 0. As a conclusion, the
signed importance index should be more interpreted as an indicator of overall tendency
of monotonicity, rather than an importance index.
(iii) Unanimity games being monotone, the two importance indices coincide. Attribute 1 has a
null importance index because ux is constant w.r.t. attribute 1. Attribute 3 has a greater
importance index than attribute 2 because there is a variation of ux(z) along the second
attribute z2 only if z3 = 3, while there is variation along z3 for z2 = 1, 2.
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Example 3 (Thermal comfort). Thermal comfort is a subjective judgment depending on
humidity (X1), temperature (X2) and air velocity (X3) among other parameters. The concept
of thermal comfort has been studied from a “thermal” exchange standpoint (Fanger, 1970; Haldi
and Robinson, 2011). The Predicted Mean Vote (PMV) is an assessment of the mean thermal
feeling of individuals, on a bipolar scale taking 5 levels (from “very cold” to “very hot”). It is
based on four thermal ambient condition factors, namely, the ambient air temperature Ta in
◦C, the ambient air velocity Va in m/s, the rate of moisture in the air (humidity) Hy in %,
and the radiant temperature Tr in ◦C, and on two personal parameters related to each person,
namely, the metabolic coefficient Me, and the clothing insulation Ci (Haldi and Robinson,
2011; Denguir, 2014). For the purpose of this paper, we can focus on the three most influential
variables Ta, Hy and Va. The Predicted Percentage Dissatisfied (PPD) is a transformation of
the PMV into a [0, 100] scale where 0 means that there is no dissatisfaction and 100 means that
there is a complete dissatisfaction (Fanger, 1970). Figure 1 (resp. 2) shows PPD as a function
of Ta and Hy (resp. Ta and Va).
Figure 1: This picture represents the value of PPD as a function of Ta, for different values
of Hy. Parameter V a is fixed to 0.2. The ten curves correspond to 10 fixed values of Hy
from 0% to 100%. The red plane (resp. blue) cuts the PPD curves at value Ta = 25◦C (resp.
Ta = 23◦C). These planes clearly show that the value of Ta minimizing PPD depends on Hy.
Source (Denguir, 2014, Fig 10).
Figure 2: This picture presents PPD, as in Fig 1. More specifically, Hy is now fixed to 50%,
the ten curves represent PPD as a function of Ta, for ten values of V a from 0 to 1. Source
(Denguir, 2014, Fig 11).
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We consider that the function U measures the discomfort level over the set X = X1×X2×X3
defined by (Figure 3):
U(0, 23, 0) = 2 U(0, 25, 0) = 4 U(0, 28, 0) = 7
U(50, 23, 0) = 5 U(50, 25, 0) = 7 U(50, 28, 0) = 10
U(100, 23, 0) = 10 U(100, 25, 0) = 12 U(100, 28, 0) = 15
U(0, 23, 0.2) = 10 U(0, 25, 0.2) = 7 U(0, 28, 0.2) = 15
U(50, 23, 0.2) = 30 U(50, 25, 0.2) = 35 U(50, 28, 0.2) = 45
U(100, 23, 0.2) = 65 U(100, 25, 0.2) = 70 U(100, 28, 0.2) = 85
U(0, 23, 1) = 40 U(0, 25, 1) = 35 U(0, 28, 1) = 30
U(50, 23, 1) = 87 U(50, 25, 1) = 75 U(50, 28, 1) = 70
U(100, 23, 1) = 97 U(100, 25, 1) = 90 U(100, 28, 1) = 83
We define the multichoice game v ∈ G(L) with L = {0, 1, 2}3 by
v(x) = U(Z(x))− U(Z(0, 0, 0)), for any x ∈ L,
where Z is a transformation of the elements of L in X:
Z(0, 0, 0) = (0, 23, 0) Z(0, 1, 0) = (0, 25, 0) Z(0, 2, 0) = (0, 28, 0)
Z(1, 0, 0) = (50, 23, 0) Z(1, 1, 0) = (50, 25, 0) Z(1, 2, 0) = (50, 28, 0)
Z(2, 0, 0) = (100, 23, 0) Z(2, 1, 0) = (100, 25, 0) Z(2, 2, 0) = (100, 28, 0)
Z(0, 0, 1) = (0, 23, 0.2) Z(0, 1, 1) = (0, 25, 0.2) Z(0, 2, 1) = (0, 28, 0.2)
Z(1, 0, 1) = (50, 23, 0.2) Z(1, 1, 1) = (50, 25, 0.2) Z(1, 2, 1) = (50, 28, 0.2)
Z(2, 0, 1) = (100, 23, 0.2) Z(2, 1, 1) = (100, 25, 0.2) Z(2, 2, 1) = (100, 28, 0.2)
Z(0, 0, 2) = (0, 23, 1) Z(0, 1, 2) = (0, 25, 1) Z(0, 2, 2) = (0, 28, 1)
Z(1, 0, 2) = (50, 23, 1) Z(1, 1, 2) = (50, 25, 1) Z(1, 2, 2) = (50, 28, 1)
Z(2, 0, 2) = (100, 23, 1) Z(2, 1, 2) = (100, 25, 1) Z(2, 2, 2) = (100, 28, 1)
It is clear that the function v is not monotone in its three arguments.
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Figure 3: Discomfort level w.r.t. X1, X2 and X3. Blue cube=comfortable ([0, 10]), green
diamond=fairly comfortable (]10, 60]), red triangle=uncomfortable (]60, 100]).
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The computation of the importance index w.r.t. v gives,
φs1(v) ≈ 188.17, φs2(v) ≈ 17.67, φs3(v) ≈ 247.17,
φa1(v) ≈ 188.17, φa2(v) ≈ 50.33, φa3(v) ≈ 248.50.
The values of the absolute importance index show that air velocity is the most important
criterion, then humidity, which both seem to be fairly more important than temperature. This
slightly surprising conclusion may be explained by the fact that humidity variations (between 0
and 1) induce large variations in U (e.g., U(0, 23, 0) = 2 = U(0, 23, 1, )/20) while temperature
variations (between 23 and 28) induce smaller variations in U (e.g., U(0, 23, 0) = U(0, 28, 0)/3.5).
Hence, the conclusion should be rather that, within the interval [23,28], temperature is relatively
less important than humidity and air velocity.
The value of the signed importance index coincides with the absolute importance index for
humidity since in the interval of temperature considered, the discomfort is increasing w.r.t. this
attribute. The conclusion is almost the same for air velocity: the discomfort is increasing on
most of the domain, except for high values, where it slightly decreases. By contrast, it can be
checked on the table that the temperature has a more complex behavior. Depending on the
values of the two other attributes, the discomfort is sometimes increasing, sometimes decreasing,
and sometimes has a bell shape w.r.t. temperature. This is why the signed and the absolute
importance indices differ, and the former one indicates that there is a slight overall tendency
for the discomfort to augment with temperature.
9 The continuous case
In the continuous case of an aggregation function F , we have seen that a natural definition of the
importance index is given by (7). It has been shown that this formula applied on [0, 1]n yields
the Shapley value when the aggregation function is the Choquet integral (see Marichal (1998,
proposition 5.3.3 page 141) and also Grabisch et al. (2009, Definition 10.41 and Proposition
10.43 page 369)). We generalize this result in this section.
9.1 Definition of the Choquet integral
We consider first a normalized (1-ary) capacity on N , that is, a set function µ : 2N → R
satisfying monotonicity (µ(A) ≤ µ(B) whenever A ⊆ B), and the normalization conditions
µ(∅) = 0, µ(N) = 1. The set of permutations on N is denoted by S. For σ ∈ S, we define
Ωσ = {t ∈ RN : tσ(1) ≤ tσ(2) ≤ · · · ≤ tσ(n)}. The Choquet integral of t ∈ [0, 1]N can be written
in terms of the capacity µ (Choquet, 1953)
Cµ(t) =
n∑
i=1
(
tσ(i) − tσ(i−1)
)
µ ({σ(i), · · · , σ(n)}) , (24)
where tσ(0) := 0 and σ is a permutation on N such that t ∈ Ωσ.
The Choquet integral can also be defined w.r.t. a kN -ary capacity v : L → R. For x ∈
X := ×i∈N [0, ki], we define qi(x) ∈ Li by qi(x) ≤ xi < qi(x) + 1 if xi < ki, and qi(ki) = ki − 1.
We set q(x) = (q1(x), . . . , qn(x)). Point x lies in the n-dimensional interval [q(x), q(x) + 1N ].
The Choquet integral at x w.r.t. v is then simply the usual Choquet integral (24) at point
x− q(x) ∈ [0, 1]n w.r.t. a game µvq(x), defined by
µvq(S) = v((q + 1)S , qN\S)− v(q). (25)
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Then the Choquet integral of x w.r.t. v is defined by (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2003, 2008;
Labreuche and Grabisch, 2018)
Cv(x) = Cµv
q(x)
(x− q(x)) + v(q(x)). (26)
9.2 Computation of the importance indices
For an aggregation function F defined on an interval [0, kN ] = ×i∈N [0, ki], we can define the
signed and absolute importance of criterion i by
Signed importance: ψsi (F ) =
∫
[0,kN ]
∂F (x)
∂xi
dx, (27)
Absolute importance: ψai (F ) =
∫
[0,kN ]
∣∣∣∣∂F (x)∂xi
∣∣∣∣ dx, (28)
The next result relates the importance indices on v with the indices defined on aggregation
functions.
Theorem 5. For every i ∈ N ,
ψsi (Cv) = φsi(v), for any kN -ary capacity v, (29)
ψai (Cv) = φai (v), for any v ∈ G(L). (30)
10 Another axiomatization
Lemma 3 in the proof of Theorem 1 shows that the signed importance index can be written as
a sum over the grid of the Shapley value of local classical games limited to one elementary cell
of the grid. The next axiomatization follows this scheme by considering that the domain can
be decomposed into cells (axiom (DD)) and that the computation in one cell is invariant by
translation (axiom (T)).
For any a = (a1, . . . , an) and b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ Nn0 , with N0 = N∪ {0}, such that ai < bi for
all i ∈ N , define Lai,bii = {ai, ai + 1, . . . , bi} and La,b = ×i∈NLai,bii .
In this section, we consider a multichoice game as a mapping v on Lm,M such that v(m) = 0,
with m = (m1, . . . ,mn) and M = (M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ Nn0 indicating the lower bound and upper
bound on each attribute. We denote by G(Lm,M ) the set of multichoice games on Lm,M . For
v ∈ G(Lm,M ) and any a, b ∈ Nn0 such that mi ≤ ai < bi ≤Mi for all i, we define the restriction
v′ := v|La,b in G(La,b) as v′(x) = v(x) for all x ∈ La,b.
The aim of this section is to define and axiomatize an importance index φm,Mi (v) for any
attribute i ∈ N and game v ∈ G(Lm,M ). Note that L = L0N ,kN , and φ = φ0N ,kN , while letting
0N = (0, . . . , 0), 1N = (1, . . . , 1), a classical game is an element of G(L0N ,1N ).
The first axiom says that φ can be additively decomposed on the lattice Lm,M .
Decomposition over Domains (DD): Let j ∈ N and ` ∈ N such that mj < ` <
Mj .
Let v ∈ G(Lm,M ). We define v1 = v|Lm,(`j ,M−j) and v2 = v|L(`j ,m−j),M . Then for every
i ∈ N
φm,Mi (v) = φ
m,(`j ,M−j)
i (v1) + φ
(`j ,m−j),M
i (v2). (31)
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Remark 4. From DD applied
∏
i∈N (Mi −mi − 1) times, we obtain
φm,Mi (v) =
∑
y∈Lm,M−1N
φy,y+1Ni (v|Ly,y+1N ). (32)
Linearity axiom (L01) : φ
0N ,1N is linear on G(L0N ,1N ), i.e., ∀v, w ∈ G(L0N ,1N ),∀α ∈
R,
φ0N ,1N (v + αw) = φ0N ,1N (v) + αφ0N ,1N (w).
Definition 1. An attribute i ∈ N is said to be null for v ∈ G(L0N ,1N ) if
v(x+ 1i) = v(x), for every x ∈ L0N ,1N such that xi = 0.
Null axiom (N01): If an attribute i is null for v ∈ G(L0N ,1N ), then
φ0N ,1Ni (v) = 0.
Equal Treatment (ET01): Let v ∈ G(L0N ,1N ) and i, j ∈ N .
If v(x+ 1i) = v(x+ 1j) for all x ∈ L0N ,1N with xi = 0 and xj = 0, then
φ0N ,1Ni (v) = φ
0N ,1N
j (v).
Efficiency (E01) : ∀v ∈ G(L0N ,1N ),
∑
i∈N φ
0N ,1N
i (v) = v(N).
The next axiom is a translation property. It says that the computation of the importance
index in one elementary cell Ly,y+1N does not depend on the origin point y: it can be obtained
from the computation of the index in L0N ,1N cell by a shift operation on the game.
Translation axiom (T): For all y ∈ Lm,M , such that y + 1N ≤ M , and for any
i ∈ N ,
φy,y+1Ni (v) = φ
0N ,1N
i (Ty ◦ v),
where v ∈ G(Ly,y+1N ) and Ty ◦ v is a game in G(L0N ,1N ) defined by Ty ◦ v(z) =
v(y + z)− v(y),∀z ∈ L0N ,1N .
Theorem 6. Under axioms (DD), (L01), (N01), (T), (ET01) and (E01), ∀v ∈ G(Lm,M )
φm,Mi (v) = φ
s;m,M
i (v) =
∑
x−i∈Lm,M−i
(n− σ(x−i)− 1)!κ(x−i)!
(n+ κ(x−i)− σ(x−i))!
(
v(x−i,Mi)− v(x−i,mi)
)
,∀i ∈ N.
We turn now to the axiomatization of the family defined by the absolute value.
Decomposition over Domains for Monotone games (DDM) : φm,M satisfies
the (DD) axiom on GM (Lm,M ).
Conic Combination axiom (CC01): For every v, w ∈ G+(L0N ,1N ), for every
α ∈ R+,
φ0N ,1N (v + αw) = φ0N ,1N (v) + αφ0N ,1N (w).
Decomposition axiom (D01): If v, w ∈ G+(L0N ,1N ) and v − w ∈ GM (L0N ,1N ),
then
φ0N ,1N (v − w) = φ0N ,1N (v)− φ0N ,1N (w).
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Efficiency for Monotone games (EM01) : φ
0N ,1N satisfies the (E01) axiom on
GM (L0N ,1N ).
We also use the marginal contribution axiom (MC) introduced in Section 6, but here for
games in G(Lm,M ).
Proposition 5. Under axioms (DDM), (CC01), (D01), (N01), (ET01), (T), (EM01) and
(MC), ∀v ∈ G(Lm,M ),∀i ∈ N ,
φm,Mi (v) = φ
a;m,M
i (v) =
∑
x∈Lm,M
xi<Mi
(n− σ(x−i)− 1)!κ(x−i)!
(n+ κ(x−i)− σ(x−i))! |v(x+ 1i)− v(x)|.
11 Concluding remarks
We have presented in this paper two families of importance indices, the signed and the absolute
importance indices, together with two remarkable representatives φa, φs. They are valid for
any kind of numerical model of representation of preferences (monotonic or not, discrete or
continuous), and we have characterized them through natural and interpretable axioms. Further
generalization is possible through the use of norms, but still further investigation is necessary.
The proposed indices are close in spirit to the Shapley value, and a similar approach could
also be undertaken using the Banzhaf value as starting point.
Both indices can be useful, and their combination may shed light on the model under
analysis. The signed index indicates the overall trend of the model w.r.t. an attribute: increasing
or decreasing. The absolute index measures the amount of variation of the model induced by an
attribute. An attribute having a high value of the absolute importance index and a low value
of the signed importance index indicates an attribute which has a strong contribution in the
model, but the model is not monotonic w.r.t. this attribute: it could be bell-shaped or could
have a more complex behavior. We have illustrated the usage of these indices on examples,
among which a modelling of discomfort based on real data. Lastly, we mention that these
indices contribute to the theory of multichoice games by providing a new type of Shapley value.
Our axiomatization results are summarized in the following table, in which a “ + ” means
that a value satisfies the axiom, while “− ” has the converse meaning. Symbol “× ” shows that
the axiom is used for the axiomatization.
L I SD E CC MC AE C
φs × × × × + − − +
φa − × × − × × × ×
Appendix A Proof of the results
The following lemma is used to prove Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. Under axioms (L) and (N), for all i ∈ N , there exists pix ∈ R, for all x ∈ L with
xi < ki, such that ∀v ∈ G(L),
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
pix
(
v(x+ 1i)− v(x)
)
. (33)
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Proof. It is easy to check that the above formula satisfies the two axioms. Conversely, we
consider φ satisfying (L) and (N). We have v =
∑
x∈L v(x)δx. Then by (L),
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
v(x)φi(δx),∀i ∈ N.
Setting aix = φi(δx), ∀x ∈ L,∀i ∈ N , we obtain, assuming i is null for v:
0 = φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
aixv(x) (34)
=
∑
x−i∈L−i
∑
xi∈Li
ai(x−i,xi)v(x−i, xi)
=
∑
x−i∈L−i
( ∑
xi∈Li
ai(x−i,xi)
)
v(x−i, 0i).
Hence, ∀x−i ∈ L−i,
∑
xi∈Li a(x−i,xi) = 0.
Letting p(x−i,ji) =
∑k
`=j+1 a(x−i,`i),∀x−i ∈ L−i,∀j ∈ Li \ ki, we have, for all x−i ∈ L−i,
a(x−i,0i) = −p(x−i,0i),
a(x−i,ki) = p(x−i,(ki−1)i),
a(x−i,`i) = p(x−i,(`−1)i) − p(x−i,`i),∀`i ∈ Li \ {0, ki}.
Therefore, it suffices to replace the values of ai(x−i,xi) in Formula (34), and the result is estab-
lished.
Proof of Proposition 1. It is easy to check that the given formula satisfies the axioms. Con-
versely, consider φ satisfying (L) and (I). Let v, w ∈ G(L) such that v, w satisfy the premise of
the Invariance axiom, and i ∈ N . By Lemma 1 and (I), we have:
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
pixi;x−i
(
v(x+ 1i)− v(x)
)
=
∑
x−i∈L−i
( ∑
xi∈Li
xi /∈{0,ki}
pixi;x−i
(
v(x+ 1i)− v(x)
)
+ pi0i;x−i
(
v(x−i, 1i)− v(x−i, 0i)
))
=
∑
x−i∈L−i
( ∑
xi∈Li
xi /∈{0,ki}
pixi;x−i
(
w(x)− w(x− 1i)
)
+ pi0i;x−i
(
w(x−i, ki)− w(x−i, (ki − 1)i)
))
=
∑
x−i∈L−i
( ∑
xi∈Li
xi<ki−1
pixi+1;x−i
(
w(x+ 1i)− w(x)
)
+ pi0i;x−i
(
w(x−i, ki)− w(x−i, (ki − 1)i)
))
,
and,
φi(w) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
( ∑
xi∈Li
xi<ki−1
pixi;x−i
(
w(x+ 1i)− w(x)
)
+ pi(ki−1)i;x−i
(
w(x−i, ki)− w(x−i, (ki − 1)i)
))
,
then, pixi;x−i = p
i
xi+1;x−i ,∀x−i ∈ L−i,∀xi ∈ Li \ {ki − 1, ki}.
We conclude that the coefficient pixi;x−i does not depend on xi. We denote by p
i
x−i this value.
Therefore, it suffices to replace the values of pixi;x−i in formula (33) by p
i
x−i , and the result is
established.
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The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the following lemmas:
Lemma 2. ∑
S∈[A,B]
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
=
(n− b− 1)!a!
(n− b+ a)! , ∀A,B ⊆ N,A ⊆ B,
where [A,B] = {C ⊆ N : A ⊆ C ⊆ B}.
Proof. Let A,B ⊆ N , such that A ⊆ B,∑
S∈[A,B]
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
=
∑
S∈[∅,B\A]
(n− s− a− 1)!(s+ a)!
n!
=
b−a∑
s=0
(
b− a
s
)
(n− s− a− 1)!(s+ a)!
n!
=
b−a∑
s=0
(
b− a
s
)∫ 1
0
xn−s−a−1(1− x)s+adx
=
∫ 1
0
xn−b−1(1− x)a
b−a∑
s=0
(
b− a
s
)
xb−a−s(1− x)sdx
=
∫ 1
0
xn−b−1(1− x)adx
=
(n− b− 1)!a!
(n− b+ a)!
Lemma 3. Let v ∈ G(L).
φsi(v) =
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
φShi (µ
v
x),∀i ∈ N,
with, µvx(S) = v(x+ 1S)− v(x),∀S ⊆ N, ∀x ∈ L, such that xi < ki,∀i ∈ N .
Proof. Let v ∈ G(L) and for any x ∈ L, such that xi < ki,∀i ∈ N , we define the game µvx such
that for every S ⊆ N,µvx(S) = v(x+ 1S)− v(x). We have
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φsi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
(n− σ(x−i)− 1)!κ(x−i)!
(n+ κ(x−i)− σ(x−i))!
(
v(x+ 1i)− v(x)
)
=
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
(
v(x+ 1i)− v(x)
) ∑
A⊆Σ(x−i)
A⊇K(x−i)
(n− a− 1)!a!
n!
by Lemma (2)
=
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
(
v(x+ 1i)− v(x)
) ∑
A⊆N\i∩Σ(x−i)
A⊇K(x−i)
(n− a− 1)!a!
n!
=
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
(
v(x+ 1i)− v(x)
) ∑
A⊆N\i
∀j∈A,xj>0
∀j∈N\A,xj<kj
(n− a− 1)!a!
n!
=
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
∑
S⊆N\i
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
(
v(x+ 1S∪i)− v(x+ 1S)
)
=
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
∑
S⊆N\i
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
(
µvx(S ∪ i)− µvx(S))
)
=
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
φShi (µ
v
x).
We are now in position to show Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. It is easy to check that the formula (19) satisfies the axioms (L), (I)
and (SD). Let us show that it satisfies the axiom (E). By Lemma 3, we have,∑
i∈N
φsi(v) =
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
∑
i∈N
φShi (µ
v
x)
=
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
µvx(N)
=
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
(
v(x+ 1N )− v(x)
)
.
Conversely, we consider φ satisfying the axioms (L), (I), (SD) and (E). Let x ∈ L, we write
x = (0N\S∪T , xS , kT ), with xS ∈ LS \ Γ(LS), S = Σ(x) \K(x), and T = K(x).
By Proposition 1, we have,
φi(δx) = p
i
x−i
(
δx(x−i, ki)− δx(x−i, 0i)
)
,
from which we obtain
φi(δ(x−i,ki)) = p
i
x−i = −φi(δ(x−i,0i)), (35)
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and
φi(δ(x−i,xi)) = 0, for xi ∈ Li \ {0, ki}. (36)
We only have to determine φi(δ(x−i,ki)), with x−i = (0N\S∪T , xS , kT\i).
We have ∑
i∈N
φi(δx) =
∑
i∈T
φi(δx) +
∑
i∈S
φi(δx) +
∑
i∈N\S∪T
φi(δx)
and by (36), we obtain,∑
i∈N
φi(δx) =
∑
i∈T
φi(δx−i,ki) +
∑
i∈N\S∪T
φi(δx−i,0i). (37)
We distinguish the two following cases:
(i) If S ∪ T = N , ∑
j∈N
φj(δx) = (n− s)φi(δx−i,ki), ∀i ∈ T (38)
(ii) If S ∪ T 6= N ,∑
`∈N
φ`(δx) = tφi(δx−i,ki) + (n− s− t)φj(δx−j ,0j ),∀i ∈ T, ∀j ∈ N \ S ∪ T. (39)
Hence, φi(δ(x−i,ki)) satisfies
• by (38) and (15),
∀i ∈ K(x), (with σ(x) = n), φi(δ(x−i,ki)) =
1
n− s, ∀s ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1},
• by (39) and (17), ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, ∀s ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} with s+ t ≤ n− 1,
φi(δ(x−ij ,0j ,ki)) = −
n− s− t
t
φj(δ(x−ij ,0j ,ki)),
and by (35), we obtain
φi(δ(x−ij ,0j ,ki)) =
n− s− t
t
φj(δ(x−ij ,kj ,ki)).
Thus, recursively,
φi(δ(0N\S∪T ,xS ,kT\i,ki)) =
n− s− t
t
φj(δ(0N\S∪T1 ,xS ,kT1 )
), T1 = T ∪ {j}
φi(δ(0N\S∪T1 ,xS ,kT1\i,ki)
) =
n− s− t− 1
t+ 1
φj(δ(0N\S∪T2 ,xS ,kT2 )
), T2 = T1 ∪ {j}
1
...
φi(δ(0j ,xS ,kTn−s−1\i,ki)
) =
1
n− s− 1φj(δ(xS ,kTn−s )), Tn−s = Tn−s−1 ∪ {j}.
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Therefore,
φi(δ(x−i,ki)) =
(n− s− t)!(t− 1)!
(n− s)!
=
(
n− σ(x))!(κ(x)− 1)!(
n+ κ(x)− σ(x))!
=
(
n− σ(x−i, ki)
)
!
(
κ(x−i, ki)− 1
)
!(
n+ κ(x−i, ki)− σ(x−i, ki)
)
!
=
(
n− σ(x−i)− 1
)
!
(
κ(x−i
)
!(
n+ κ(x−i)− σ(x−i)
)
!
The result is proved.
Proof of Proposition 2. By using the basis of unanimity games, and by the definition of
G+(L),
v =
∑
x∈L
mv(x)ux
for any v ∈ G+(L), and mv(x) ≥ 0. Applying (CC) we find
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
mv(x)φi(ux) (i ∈ N).
Since mv is a linear transform over G(L), mv(x) is a linear combination of all coefficients v(y),
y ∈ L, say mv(x) = ∑y∈L a(x, y)v(y). Then
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
(∑
y∈L
a(x, y)v(y)
)
φi(ux)
=
∑
y∈L
v(y)
∑
x∈L
a(x, y)φi(ux)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aiy
giving the desired form, where aiy are real constants independent from v. Consider now a game
v ∈ GM (L). Applying (6), we write v = v+ − v−, and by (CC) we find
φi(v) = φi(v
+ − v−) = φi(v+)− φi(v−) =
∑
x∈L
aixv
+(x)−
∑
x∈L
aixv
−(x) =
∑
x∈L
aixv(x).
The proof of Proposition 3 is based on the following lemma
Lemma 4. Let i ∈ N . For every v ∈ G(L), there exists w ∈ GM (L), such that |∆iv| = |∆iw|.
Proof. Let v ∈ G(L) and i ∈ N . For every y−i ∈ L−i we set,
D(xi, y−i) =
∑
zi∈Li
zi<xi
|∆iv(zi, y−i)|,∀xi ∈ Li \ {0}, and D(0i, y−i) = 0.
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Define the following multichoice game w:
w(0, . . . , 0) = 0
w(0i, x−i) = max
xi∈Li
y−i∈L−i,y−ix−i
(w(0i, y−i) +D(xi, y−i)−D(xi, x−i)), x−i ∈ L−i
w(xi, y−i) = w(0i, y−i) +D(xi, y−i), xi > 0, y−i ∈ L−i.
Then by construction we have w(x + 1i) = w(x) + |∆iv(x)|, ∀x ∈ L, xi < ki. We prove now
monotonocity. Let j ∈ N \ i, and x ∈ L such that xj < kj . If xi = 0, we have for every y ∈ L
such that y−i  x−i + 1j ,
w(0i, x−i + 1j) ≥ w(0i, y−i) +D(y)−D(yi, x−i + 1j). (40)
Taking yi = 0 and y−i = x−i, we have
w(0i, x−i + 1j) ≥ w(0i, x−i).
If now xi 6= 0, we have for every y ∈ L such that y−i  x−i + 1j ,
w(x+ 1j) ≥ w(0i, y−i) +D(y)−D(yi, x−i + 1j) +D(x+ 1j), by (40).
Taking y = x, we obtain
w(x+ 1j) ≥ w(0i, x−i) +D(x).
Hence, w is a monotone multichoice game.
We now prove Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let v ∈ G(L), by Lemma 4 there exists a monotone multichoice
game w, such that |∆iv(x)| = |∆iw(x)| for all x ∈ L, xi < ki.
Observe that (CC) implies φi(0) = 0 for all i ∈ N , where 0 indicates the null game. Suppose
now that i is a null player in w. It follows that ∆iw(x) = 0 = ∆i0(x) for all x. Then by (MC),
we deduce φi(w) = 0. In other words, φ satisfies the null axiom (N) for any game w ∈ GM (L)
(and even for any nonmonotonic game). Then proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 1, we
deduce:
φi(w) =
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
pix(w(x+ 1i)− w(x)),
and by axiom (MC) we have, for all i ∈ N ,
φi(v) = φi(w)
=
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
pix(w(x+ 1i)− w(x))
=
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
pix|∆iv(x)|.
The proof of Proposition 4 works as in the case of Proposition 1.
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Proof of Theorem 3. It is easy to check that the formula (23) satisfies the axioms (CC),
(I), (SD), (AE) and (MC). Let us show that it satisfies the axiom (C). For every x ∈ L such
that σ(x) = n, we have,
φai (δx−i,ki) =
(n− σ(x−i)− 1)!κ(x−i)!
(n+ κ(x−i)− σ(x−i))!
=
κ(x−i)!
(κ(x−i) + 1)!
=
1
κ(x)
.
Conversely, we consider φ satisfying the axioms (CC), (I), (SD), (AE), (MC) and (C).
Let x ∈ L, we write x = (0N\S∪T , xS , kT ), with xS ∈ LS\Γ(LS), S = Σ(x)\K(x), and T = K(x).
By Proposition 4, we have
φi(δx) = p
i
x−i
∑
yi∈Li
yi<ki
|δx(x−i, yi + 1)− δx(x−i, yi)|, ∀i ∈ N.
Then we obtain,
φi(δ(x−i,ki)) = φi(δ(x−i,0i)) = p
i
x−i , (41)
and
φi(δ(x−i,xi)) = 2φi(δ(x−i,ki)), for xi ∈ Li \ {0, ki}. (42)
We only have to determine φi(δ(x−i,ki)), with x−i = (0N\S∪T , xS , kT\i).
We distinguish the two following cases:
(i) If S ∪ T = N , by axiom (C), we have
φi(δxN\T ,kT\i,ki) =
1
t
.
(ii) If S∪T 6= N , by axioms (SD) and (AE), we have, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, ∀s ∈ {1, . . . , n−2}
with s+ t < n,
φi(δ(0N\S∪T ,xS ,kT\i,ki)) =
n− s− t
t
φj(δ(0j ,0N\S∪T∪j ,xS ,kT )),
by (41), we obtain,
φi(δ(0N\S∪T ,xS ,kT\i,ki)) =
n− s− t
t
φj(δ(0N\S∪T∪j ,xS ,kT∪j\i,ki)),
and thus, recursively,
φi(δ(0N\S∪T ,xS ,kT\i,ki)) =
n− s− t
t
φj(δ(0N\S∪T∪j ,xS ,kT∪{j}))
1
...
=
(n− s− t)!(t− 1)!
(n− s− 1)! φj(δ(xS ,kN\S∪j ,kj)).
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By axiom (C), we finally obtain
φi(δ(0N\S∪T ,xS ,kT\i,ki)) =
(n− s− t)!(t− 1)!
(n− s)!
=
(
n− s(x))!(k(x)− 1)!(
n+ k(x)− s(x))!
=
(
n− s(x−i)− 1
)
!
(
k(x−i)
)
!(
n+ k(x−i)− s(x−i)
)
!
.
The result is proved.
Proof of Theorem 4. To keep notation simple we assume k1 = · · · = kn = k, but this is not
limitative.
1. We first establish the following general result.
Lemma 5. Let g : Rn → Rm, m ≤ n, be a linear mapping, with dim(Ker(g)) = `. Consider
f : Rn → Rm a linear mapping. Then
Ker(f) = Ker(g)⇔ f = h ◦ g,
with h : Rm → Rm a linear mapping and dim(Ker(h)) ≤ m− n+ `.
Proof. Consider first that Ker(g) = {0}, Then n = m, ` = 0 and f, g, h are bijections, with
h = f ◦ g−1.
Consider now that Ker(g) 6= {0}, then ` ≥ 1. Choose B = {v1, . . . , vn} with vi ∈ Rm, a
basis of Rn such that {v1, . . . , v`} is a basis of Ker(g). Then g(vi) = f(vi) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , `,
and g, f are uniquely determined by the images of vectors vl+1, . . . , vn by g and f . We claim
that g(v`+1), . . . , g(vn) are independent vectors. Indeed, suppose there exist λ`+1, . . . , λn ∈ R,
not all equal to 0, such that
∑n
i=`+1 λig(vi) = 0. By linearity of g,
0 =
n∑
i=`+1
λig(vi) = g
( n∑
i=`+1
λivi
)
,
i.e.,
∑n
i=`+1 λivi ∈ Ker(g), which is impossible since {v1, . . . , v`} is a basis of Ker(g). The
same conclusion holds for f(v`+1), . . . , f(vn). Therefore, there exists a mapping h : Rm → Rm
transforming the set of independent vectors g(v`+1), . . . , g(vn) into the set of independent vectors
f(v`+1), . . . , f(vn), letting, e.g., f(vi) = h(g(vi)), i = `+ 1, . . . , n, and dim(Ker(h)) ≤ m− (n−
`).
As a particular case, if dim(Ker(g)) = n−m, then h is a bijection.
2. Observe that the derivative of a game can be considered as a linear map ∆i : R(k+1)
n−1 →
Rk(k+1)n−1 . Its kernel is the set of games v such that ∆iv = 0 pointwise (which is equivalent to:
i is null for v), i.e., v(z + 1i) = v(z) for all z ∈ L such that zi < k, from which it follows that
v(z−i, 0i) = v(z−i, 1i) = · · · = v(z−i, ki). Hence, dim(Ker(∆i)) = (k + 1)n−1 − 1.
It is easy to see that the basis of the kernel is {uz}z∈L,zi=0, therefore the basis of the
supplementary space (let us call it B) is {uz}z∈L,zi>0.
3. Define the linear map g : G(L)→ G(L) by
g(uz) =
{
0, if z ∈ L, zi = 0
uz, otherwise.
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Then Ker(g) = Ker(∆i), and by Lemma 5 it follows that g = h ◦∆i and h is a linear bijection
on Rk(k+1)n−1 . Moreover, Im(g) = B.
Now, we can write φi = ψ ◦ g with ψ : B → R+, which defines ψ unambiguously. We
show that ψ is a norm on B, which finishes the proof. Consider v1, v2 ∈ B, then there exist
w1, w2 ∈ G(L) such that v1 = g(w1) and v2 = g(w2). We have:
• Suppose ψ(v1) = 0. Then 0 = ψ(v1) = ψ(g(w1)) = φi(w1), hence by (SN) this is
equivalent to w1 ∈ Ker(∆i) = Ker(g), equivalent to v1 = g(w1) = 0.
• For all α ∈ R, ψ(αv1) = ψ(αg(w1)) = ψ(g(αw1)) = φi(αw1), which by (AH) is equal to
|α|φi(w1) = |α|ψ(v1).
• ψ(v1 + v2) = ψ(g(w1 + w2)) = φi(w1 + w2) ≤ φi(w1) + φi(w2) = ψ(v1) + ψ(v2), where we
have used (SA).
Hence, ψ is a norm on B.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let v a kN -ary capacity. For every i ∈ N , we have, by Lemma 3,
φsi(v) =
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
φShi (µ
v
x)
=
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
∫
[0,1]n
∂Cµvx(t)
∂ti
dt
=
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
∫
[x,x+1N ]
∂Cµvx(z − x)
∂zi
dz
=
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
∫
[x,x+1N ]
∂Cv(z)
∂zi
dz
=
∫
[0,kN ]
∂Cv(z)
∂zi
dz.
Hence (29) is proved.
Let v ∈ G(L), by Lemma 4 there exists w ∈ GM (L) such that |∆iv(x)| = |∆iw(x)| for all
x ∈ L, xi < ki. Then
∣∣∣∂Cv(x)∂xi ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∂Cw(x)∂xi ∣∣∣ for all x ∈ [0, kN ]. Hence, ψai (Cv) = ψai (Cw) = ψsi (Cw),
and by (29), we have
ψai (Cv) = φsi(Cw).
29
By Theorem 1 we have
φsi(Cw) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
(n− σ(x−i)− 1)!κ(x−i)!
(n+ κ(x−i)− σ(x−i))!
(
w(x−i, ki)− w(x−i, 0i)
)
=
∑
x−i∈L−i
(n− σ(x−i)− 1)!κ(x−i)!
(n+ κ(x−i)− σ(x−i))!
∑
xi∈Li
xi<ki
|w(x+ 1i)− w(x)|
=
∑
x∈L
xi<ki
(n− σ(x−i)− 1)!κ(x−i)!
(n+ κ(x−i)− σ(x−i))! |v(x+ 1i)− v(x)|
= φai (Cv).
Hence (30) is proved.
Proof of Theorem 6. It is easy to check that the formula satisfies all axioms.
Conversely, assume that φm,M satisfies all axioms, we have φ0N ,1N = φSh.
From (32) and (T), we have
φm,Mi (v) =
∑
y∈Lm,M−1N
φ0N ,1Ni (Ty ◦ v|Ly,y+1N )
=
∑
y∈Lm,M−1N
φShi (Ty ◦ v|Ly,y+1N )
=
∑
y∈Lm,M−1N
∑
x−i∈L0N,1N−i
(n− σ(x−i)− 1)!σ(x−i)!
n
(
Ty ◦ v|Ly,y+1N (x+ 1i)− Ty ◦ v|Ly,y+1N (x)
)
=
∑
y∈Lm,M−1N
∑
x−i∈L0N,1N−i
(n− σ(x−i)− 1)!σ(x−i)!
n
(
v(x+ y + 1i)− v(x+ y)
)
=
∑
y∈Lm,M−1N
∑
S⊆N\i
(n− s− 1)!s!
n
(
v(y + 1S∪i)− v(y + 1S)
)
=
∑
z∈Lm,M
zi<Mi
(
v(z + 1i)− v(z)
) ∑
S⊆N\i
∀j∈S,zj>mj
∀j∈N\S,zj<Mj
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
=
∑
z∈Lm,M
zi<Mi
(
v(z + 1i)− v(z)
) ∑
S⊆(N\i)∩∑(z−i)
S⊇K(z−i)
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
=
∑
z∈Lm,M
zi<Mi
(
v(z + 1i)− v(z)
) ∑
S⊆∑(z−i)
S⊇K(z−i)
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
=
∑
z∈Lm,M
zi<Mi
(n− σ(z−i)− 1)!κ(z−i)!
(n+ κ(z−i)− σ(z−i))!
(
v(z + 1i)− v(z)
)
.
Proof of Proposition 5. It is easy to check that the formula satisfies all axioms.
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Conversely, assume that φm,M satisfies all axioms. For every v ∈ GM (L0N ,1N ), we have
φ0N ,1N (v) = φSh(v). Let now v ∈ G(Lm,M ), by Lemma 4 there exists a multichoice game
w ∈ GM (Lm,M ) such that |∆iv(x)| = |∆iw(x)| for all x ∈ Lm,M , xi < Mi. From (32) and (T),
we have
φm,Mi (w) =
∑
y∈Lm,M−1N
φ0N ,1Ni (Ty ◦ w|Ly,y+1N )
=
∑
y∈Lm,M−1N
φShi (Ty ◦ w|Ly,y+1N )
=
∑
x∈Lm,M
xi<Mi
(n− σ(x−i)− 1)!κ(x−i)!
(n+ κ(x−i)− σ(x−i))!
(
w(x+ 1i)− w(x)
)
.
The result is then obvious by (MC).
Appendix B Logical independence of Axioms for Theorem 2
The following indices show that the four axioms (L), (I’), (S D) and (E) are logically inde-
pendent.
• Consider the value φ defined by
∀v ∈ G(L),∀i ∈ N,φi(v) = 0.
This value satisfies (L), (I’), (S D) but not (E).
• Consider the value φ given by
∀v ∈ G(L), ∀i ∈ N,φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
(µvx(N)
n
+
∑
S 6=N
S3i
(
n−s)(sµvx(S)− (n−s)µvx(N \S))),
with µvx(S) = v(x+ 1S)−v(x), ∀S ⊆ N. This value satisfies (L), (SD) and (E). However,
it does not satisfy the invariance axiom (I’).
• The value φ on G(L) defined for each v ∈ G(L) and each i ∈ N , by
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
βi(µ
v
x)∑
i∈N βi(µvx)
µx(N),
where βi is the Banzhaf value on G(2N ) and µvx(A) = v(x+ 1A)− v(x),∀A ⊆ N , satisfies
(I’), (SD), (E) but not (L).
• We consider the value φ defined by
∀v ∈ G(L), ∀i ∈ N,φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
(
v(x+ 1{i,...,n})− v(x+ 1{i+1,...,n})
)
.
The value φ satisfies (L), (I’), (E) but not (S D).
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Appendix C Logical independence of Axioms for Theorem 3
• Consider the value φ defined by
∀v ∈ G(L),∀i ∈ N,φi(v) = 0.
This value satisfies (CC), (I), (SD), (AE), (MC) but not (C).
• Consider the value φ given by
∀v ∈ G(L),∀i ∈ N,φi(v) = φai (v) +
∑
x∈L\{0N ,kN}
xi<ki−1
|v(x+ 1i)− v(x)|.
This value satisfies (CC), (SD), (MC), (AE) and (C). However, it does not satisfy the
invariance axiom (I).
• We consider the value φ defined by
∀v ∈ G(L),∀i ∈ N,φi(v) =

φai (v), if i ∈ S(v)∑
x∈L,xi<ki
|v(x+ 1i)− v(x)|, otherwise, (43)
with S(v) =
⋃
x∈L:v(x) 6=0
Σ(x).
The value φ satisfies (CC), (SD), (MC), (I), (C) but not (AE).
• Consider the value φ given by
∀v ∈ G(L), ∀i ∈ N,φi(v) =

φai (v), if i ∈ S(v) \K(v)
φsi(v), if i ∈ K(v)
−φsi(v), otherwise,
(44)
with S(v) =
⋃
x∈L:v(x) 6=0
Σ(x), and K(v) =
⋃
x∈L:v(x)6=0
κ(x)
This value satisfies (CC), (SD), (I), (AE) and (C). However, it does not satisfy the
marginal contribution axiom (MC).
• The value φ on G(L) defined for each v ∈ G(L) and each i ∈ N , by
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
∀j∈N,xj<kj
∣∣∣(v(x+ 1{i,...,n})− v(x+ 1{i+1,...,n}))∣∣∣,
satisfies (CC), (I), (AE), (MC) and (C) but not (S D).
• We consider the value φ defined by
∀v ∈ G(L), ∀i ∈ N,φi(v) = φai (v) + 1.
The value φ satisfies (SD), (MC), (I), (C) and (AE) but not (CC).
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